

Supreme Court No. _____

Case #: 1036167

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 83766-4

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SNAP MOBILE, INC.,

Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ARGYROU, LEERA KPEA, BRIAN LEE,
LEIGHTON RUSH, MARCUS THORNTON, TRAVIS
TINER, JAY WOODWORTH,

Petitioners,

and,

ALEX CARDENAS, an individual; CHRIS REINHARDT, an
individual; DYLAN REDA, an individual,

Defendants.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONERS

Appellants Michael Argyrou, Alex Cardenas, Leera Kpea, Brian Lee, Chris Reinhardt, Leighton Rush, Marcus Thornton, Travis Tiner, and Jay Woodworth (“the workers”) petition the Court of Appeals for review of the decision identified in Part II.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The workers request that the Court of Appeals review the decision of the Court of Appeals filed on December 26, 2023, and the denial of the workers’ motion for reconsideration and publication filed on October 14, 2024. These decisions are attached as Appendices A and B.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. This Court should take review under RAP 13.4(b)(3) because the Court of Appeals’ decision violates the workers constitutional due process rights. It holds claim preclusion does not apply because they did not have an opportunity to be heard the prior action, but simultaneously holds

that issue preclusion does apply and the workers are bound by the judgment in the prior action.

2. This Court should take review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2) because the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. It rejects privity analysis well-established in the common law that now allows a party to be simultaneously in privity and not in privity with the same party in the same prior action.

3. This Court should take review under RAP 13.4(b)(4) because the Court of Appeals' decision is internally contradictory and unsustainable on its face. There is a public interest in fair and sound appellate decisions.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant below, Snap Mobile Inc., sought redress in the Idaho courts for its claims that Petitioners, Snap's former workers, violated non-compete agreements after they left Snap

and found employment with an Idaho company, Vertical Raise. CP 1608-1609. Even though the workers had availed themselves of Idaho's jurisdiction by working for Vertical Raise, Snap did not seek to implead the workers in the Idaho case. The same factual and legal allegations in the case at bar were resolved in the Idaho case: the workers left Snap for Vertical Raise, ran fundraising campaigns for Vertical Raise with Snap "customers" in violation of their non-compete agreements, and as a result Snap was damaged through lost revenue and the need to find and retrain new sales representatives. Compare CP 7-9 with CP 103-104.

Snap was successful in Idaho and obtained both monetary and injunctive relief. Vertical Raise and its CEO were held liable for the monetary harms the workers allegedly caused to Snap's business. CP 1681. Also, Vertical Raise and its agents, including the workers petitioning this Court, were subjected to an 18-month injunction against further alleged violations. CP 1386-1387. Following an appeal – decided after the Court of

Appeals' decision – Vertical Raise and its CEO paid the monetary judgment from the Idaho case. Appendix C.

As this Court is aware, as of January 1, 2020, Washington State law bars lawsuits like Snap's by making these types of employment contracts void and unenforceable. RCW 49.62.020-.030. However, Snap sued these workers on December 27, 2019, four days before these statutes took effect. CP 1.

Snap's complaint alleged: "At the time defendants began working at Vertical Raise, they breached the non-solicitation and nonacceptance obligations in their Sales Representative Agreement. [*sic.*]" CP 12. Snap thus sought to litigate in Washington the exact same facts and issues, seeking the exact same damages against the workers individually that it was already litigating in Idaho.

The trial court dismissed Snap's suit against the workers on summary judgment. It concluded that the workers were in privity with Vertical Raise, that the facts and claims were the

same, and that Snap could not relitigate them under doctrines of claim and issue preclusion.

Snap appealed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals held that (1) claim preclusion *did not* apply because the workers *were not* in privity with Vertical Raise in the Idaho litigation, but (2) issue preclusion *did* apply because the workers *were* in privity with Vertical Raise in Idaho. Slip op. 13, 16.

On claim preclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled the workers lacked privity because they were not adequately represented in Idaho and Vertical Raise did not have a commonality of interest with them. *Id.* at 13. Based on this alleged lack of representation, the Court of Appeals concluded that the workers had not had a full and fair opportunity to be heard. *Id.*

On issue preclusion, however, the Court of Appeals ruled that the workers are *bound* by the Idaho judgment as to their liability and on remand may offer no defense in the present matter. Slip op. 16 (“As a result, the specific issues of the

existence of the contracts and whether the former Snap employees breached those contracts are precluded from being further litigated.”).

V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

The Court of Appeals concluded both that the workers had no opportunity to be heard in Idaho, yet they are bound by the Idaho judgment on remand. The decision misapplies, distorts and conflicts with well-established law regarding privity, claim and issue preclusion, and constitutional due process. This Court should review it.

A. This Court Should Accept Review Because the Court of Appeals’ Decision Violates the Workers’ Constitutional Due Process Rights. It Holds They Were Not Represented in the Idaho Proceeding yet Holds Them Bound By the Idaho Judgment.

On its face, the Court of Appeals’ decision subjects the workers to suit but deprives them of any opportunity to be heard on the claims. This is a staggering constitutional violation.

“Due process requires that the litigant had sufficient opportunity to be heard.” *Montana v. United States*, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (citing *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979)). As a general matter, non-parties have not had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” their claims, and so applying issue preclusion against them “runs up against the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’” *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880, 893, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) (quoting *Richards v. Jefferson County*, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996)). It is therefore “a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.” *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).

The Court of Appeals’ decision violates due process. The Court ruled that the workers did not have an opportunity to be

heard in Idaho, but it prohibited them from any opportunity to be heard in Washington. This Court should accept review to remedy this patent constitutional violation.

And although all citizens equally deserve constitutional protection, the Court of Appeals' decision is particularly troubling given Washington's public policies of protecting workers from having their rights violated by their wealthy and powerful employers. Snap has already obtained full redress in Idaho for the alleged violations of these contracts it required its workers to sign, contracts that are now illegal in Washington.

This Court should take review of a decision that violates these workers' state and federal due process protections for the benefit of an employer who has already had its day in court.

B. This Court Should Accept Review Because the Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts With Well-Established Decisions on Issue and Claim Preclusion, Particularly the Doctrine of Privity.

There is a fundamental contradiction between the Court of Appeals' ruling on claim preclusion, and its ruling on issue

preclusion. Regardless of which aspect of the ruling this Court might question, as it stands it conflicts with an existing decision.

The Court of Appeals' decision on claim preclusion conflicts with principles of law established in *Kuhlman v. Thomas*, 78 Wn. App. 115, 897 P.2d 365 (1995):

Where a plaintiff has sued parties in serial litigation over the same transaction; where plaintiff chose the original forum and had the opportunity to raise all its claims relating to the disputed transaction in the first action; where there was a “special relationship” between the defendants in each action, if not complete identity of parties; and where although the prior action was concluded, the plaintiff’s later suit continued to seek essentially similar relief—the courts have denied the plaintiff a second bite at the apple.

Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 121. These principles were adopted as Washington law following *Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp.*, 871 F.2d 1279, 1288 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864, 113 S.Ct. 186, 121 L.Ed.2d 131 (1992).

The Court of Appeals held these principles are only applied to employer-employee relationships, and that independent contractors are only in a “special relationship” under

Kuhlmann if they share a “commonality of interest.” Slip op. 13. However, the “special relationship” test from *Kuhlman* clarifies that it extends to any principal-agent relationship. *Kuhlman*, 78 Wn. App. at 121. And the Court of Appeals’ alternate “commonality of interest” test for privity appears nowhere in *Kuhlman*.

Also, the Court of Appeals distinguished *Kuhlman* on the nature of the defense proffered in the prior suit, suggesting that the principal in *Kuhlman* adequately protected its agents’ interests in the prior suit, but here Vertical Raise did not. Slip op. 13. The Court of Appeals ruled that workers’ interests were inadequately represented because in testimony Vertical Raise CEO Paul Landers attempted to, in the court’s words, “distance himself” from the workers. *Id.*

The *Kuhlmann* court’s analysis simply noted that the employer/principal defended the prior suit, and found privity. *Kuhlmann*, 78 Wn. App. at 122. It did not delve into the principal’s trial strategy or witness testimony to render value

judgments about the quality of the defense, as the Court of Appeals did here.

The Court of Appeals' decision here also contradicts this Court's precedent. This Court has held that the named party to the prior action adequately represented the party in privity if that party had a "significant stake in the outcome of the contest and invested significant resources in pursuing all viable grounds for the contest." *In re Coday*, 156 Wn.2d 485, 502, 130 P.3d 809 (2006). Nothing in this test suggests that a court may delve into witness testimony in the prior action to find a basis to reject a party's claim of privity.

There is no legal basis for abandoning the *Kuhlman* and *Coday* decisions in favor of using isolated testimony or judgment calls about trial strategy to evaluate privity. "Adequate representation" means simply that the named party in the prior action had an identity of interests with the present party and engaged in robust litigation. *See e.g., Id.* No prior Washington decision the workers could find has resorted to characterizing

witness testimony to deny a party's claim of adequate representation. *See e.g., Penner v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth.*, 25 Wn. App. 2d 914, 930, 525 P.3d 1010, *review denied*, 534 P.3d 788 (2023) (holding prior representation was adequate because lawyer was the same in both cases).

Also, in a novel application of the “adequate representation” test for privity, the Court of Appeals ignored that the *workers* were not taking issue with Vertical Raise's defense of these claims in Idaho.¹ That holding was novel because in a typical claim preclusion situation, the party who was inadequately represented in the prior action *wants* the opportunity to relitigate the issue in the new action, so that they can have adequate representation. *Compare Gonzales v. Cassidy*, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973) (class action members

¹ In fact, some of the workers travelled to Idaho to testify on Vertical Raise's behalf at trial. However, because Snap started serving subpoenas on witnesses before they testified in violation of well-established, long-standing law, some of them fled the jurisdiction and thus were unable to testify.

in prior class action not precluded from maintaining present class action after class representative in prior action failed to appeal).

Here, however, the workers were satisfied with Vertical Raise's representation Idaho and were not seeking the opportunity to represent themselves in Washington.² Yet the Court of Appeals ruled that they are subject to suit in Washington on the same claims because in the Court's view, based on isolated testimony in Idaho, they were not adequately represented.

Then, contrary to the Court of Appeals' insistence that the workers were not adequately represented in Idaho, the Court went on to rule that the workers may *not* represent themselves in the present action on the issue of liability because the Idaho

² Ironically, despite rejecting the workers' argument that they were adequately represented in Idaho, the Court of Appeals went on to deprive them of the opportunity to represent themselves in Washington by applying collateral estoppel.

judgment binds them.³ Slip op. 16 (“As a result, the specific issues of the existence of the contract and whether the former Snap employees breached those contracts are precluded from being further litigated.”).

This Court should take review because the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with prior decisions on privity analysis for purposes of claim preclusion.

C. The Workers Cannot Be Both In Privity with the Idaho Defendants and Also Not in Privity with the Idaho Defendants. This Court Should Take Review Because the Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Internally Contradictory.⁴

³ It is impossible to reconcile the two contradictory holdings here. When denying the workers’ argument for claim preclusion, the Court of Appeals held that these workers were not adequately represented in the Idaho action. But when granting Snap’s claim of issue preclusion, this Court ruled the workers are precluded from defending themselves on liability because the Idaho court’s judgment binds them.

⁴ The workers recognize that internal contradictions are not listed as a basis for review under RAP 13.4(b). Admittedly, this is an unusual circumstance. However, such a decision is arguably reviewable under RAP 13.4(b)(4), because sound internal logic in appellate decisions is an issue of substantial public interest.

There is a fundamental contradiction between the Court of Appeals' ruling on claim preclusion and its opinion on issue preclusion. This Court take review to reconcile the contradiction and clarify the law.

On claim preclusion, Court of Appeals ruled that Snap could pursue its claims in Washington against these workers because the workers were not in privity with Vertical Raise. Slip op. 13. It ruled they lacked privity because they were not adequately represented in Idaho and Vertical Raise did not have a commonality of interest with them. *Id.* In other words, the Court of Appeals ruled that the workers were neither a party to the Idaho action, nor were in privity with a party to the Idaho action.

On issue preclusion, however, Court of Appeals ruled that the workers are *bound* by the Idaho judgment as to their liability and may offer no defense in the present matter. Slip op. 16 ("As a result, the specific issues of the existence of the contracts and

whether the former Snap employees breached those contracts are precluded from being further litigated.”).

In short, the Court of Appeals on the one hand ruled that the workers cannot rely on the Idaho judgment for claim preclusion purposes, but somehow also found that they are bound by the Idaho judgment for issue preclusion purposes. This internal contradiction is an erroneous miscarriage of justice that cannot stand.

As Court of Appeals correctly states in its opinion, it is a fundamental precept of issue preclusion that one is not bound by a judgment as to a particular issue if one was not a party or in privity with a party in the prior action. Slip op. 14. A prior judgment as to an issue binds a party in the present case only if “the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case in a prior proceeding.” Slip op. 17.

Yet the Court of Appeals then asserted the doctrine *against the workers* by ruling they are bound by the judgment in Idaho

despite finding that they were not parties to it. These contradictory determinations must be addressed.

It is understandable that Court of Appeals' analysis went awry in this complex case. The workers argued for issue preclusion on liability against Snap,⁵ and Snap argued for issue preclusion against the workers. Slip. Op. 15 ("Snap and Respondents agree that both the Idaho lawsuit and the current case involved the identical issue of Respondents' breach of their Snap sales representative agreements. We also agree."). The Court of Appeals then simply stated that both parties agreed on issue preclusion as to liability. *Id.* So instead of applying its finding of no privity in the context of analyzing issue preclusion, it simply stated its agreement with both parties that issue preclusion applied. *Id.*

⁵ A ruling of issue preclusion against Snap resulted in summary judgment against Snap, because the only issue in the Washington litigation would have already been resolved by the Idaho judgment.

However, the Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge that the workers' argument for issue preclusion against Snap was *predicated on the workers being in privity with Vertical Raise*. The workers took the position that they were the same party with Vertical Raise for purposes of claim preclusion *and* issue preclusion. They argued that because the workers are in privity with Vertical Raise, Snap had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate these issues in Idaho. It could not relitigate them in Washington.

Snap's argument, on the other hand, was that the workers were not in privity with Vertical Raise yet were somehow bound by the Idaho judgment. That is why their issue preclusion argument was unsustainable, because they sought to hold the workers bound by the Idaho judgment for issue preclusion purposes despite arguing that they were not in privity for claim preclusion purposes.

The Court of Appeals adopted Snap's position that there was no privity. This ruling should have completely altered the

analysis of issue preclusion. Because this Court ruled the workers are not in privity with Vertical Raise, the workers could not be bound by the Idaho judgment.⁶ If workers were not in privity with Vertical Raise, then Court of Appeals was bound to apply the consequences of that holding to its issue preclusion analysis. If, on reconsideration, this Court again rules that the workers were not in privity for claim preclusion purposes, this Court must reverse its ruling on issue preclusion and rule the workers may defend on the issue of their liability.⁷

⁶ This contradiction is precisely why the trial court was correct in dismissing Snap's claims on summary judgment. Either the claims and parties are sufficiently similar that the Idaho judgment is the final word on this matter, or they should be relitigated, in which case there is a very real danger of inconsistent judgments resulting from the exact same set of events involving the exact same persons.

⁷ It is true that a Washington jury or appellate court could return a result inconsistent with the result in Idaho. However, a full retrial of all of the facts and evidence from the Idaho action, so the workers have a full and fair opportunity to litigate, is the only just result from a ruling that the workers were not in privity with Vertical Raise. However, the workers believe they are in privity and that claim preclusion should apply.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Court should take review to remedy a constitutional violation, apply prior decisions, and correct the unsound decision of the Court of Appeals. It should uphold the trial court's dismissal on grounds of res judicata.

This document contains 3271 words, excluding the parts of the document exempted from the word count by RAP 18.17.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of November, 2024.

CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN, P.S.

By /s/ Sidney C. Tribe

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I am an employee at Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., over the age of 18 years, not a party to nor interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness herein. On the date stated below, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the below-listed attorney(s) of record by the method(s) noted:

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APPENDIX

A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ARGYROU, an individual;
LEERA KPEA, an individual; BRIAN
LEE, an individual; LEIGHTON RUSH,
an individual; MARCUS THORNTON,
an individual; TRAVIS TINER, an
individual; JAY WOODWORTH, an
individual,

Respondents,

ALEX CARDENAS, an individual;
CHRIS REINHARDT, an individual;
DYLAN REDA, an individual,

Defendants.

No. 83766-4-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHUNG, J. — Snap! Mobile, Inc. (Snap) lost many former employees and accounts to upstart rival Vertical Raise, LLC (VR). Snap sued VR and its founder Paul Landers in Idaho for tortious interference with contract, unfair competition, and misappropriation of trade secrets, resulting in a monetary judgment and permanent injunction in Snap's favor. In this lawsuit, Snap sued several of its former employees in King County for breach of restrictive covenants in their employment agreements. Relying on the Idaho judgment, the former employees

moved for summary judgment and dismissal on their affirmative defenses of claim preclusion (*res judicata*) and issue preclusion (*collateral estoppel*). The trial court concluded both doctrines applied and granted summary judgment in the former employees' favor.

Snap appeals the dismissal of its claims. Respondents, the former employees, cross-appeal the denial of their motion to amend and their fee award. We affirm the trial court's denial of Respondents' motion to amend. However, we conclude that Snap's claims are not precluded under the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion. Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment order and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

Snap, founded in 2013, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in King County. Snap developed an online platform to help teams and schools raise money through online donation campaigns. Snap employs area sales representatives across the country who serve as the primary contacts for its customers. The sales representatives were independent contractors until Snap began converting them to W-2 employees in June 2017.

The sales representatives who chose to become employees signed a sales representative agreement. The agreement included a forum selection clause agreeing to jurisdiction in King County, Washington and resolution under Washington law for any disputes related to or arising out of the agreement, with the employee consenting to personal jurisdiction in King County Superior Court.

Additionally, the agreement included several provisions in a section entitled “Restrictive Covenants” aimed at protecting Snap’s interest in its “Proprietary and Trade Secret Information.” The restrictive covenants consisted of a non-compete clause, a non-acceptance of business clause, and a non-solicitation of business clause for the specific geographic area where the employee performed services for Snap as well as “any geographic area about which Employee learned Confidential, Proprietary, and Trade Secret Information.” The agreement also prohibited solicitation of other Snap employees. All restrictions had a duration of 18 months after termination of employment.

VR entered the online fundraising industry in 2018, five years after Snap. VR began hiring Snap sales representatives as independent contractors, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Paul Landers encouraged them to use Snap’s client lists and other confidential customer information for VR’s benefit. In October 2018, Snap sued two former employees and VR to enforce the restrictive covenants in the agreement in King County. See Snap! Mobile v. Clay, et al., Case No. 18-2-26321-2 SEA. VR successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, as its place of business was in Idaho, and the lawsuit proceeded against only the former employees.¹ In December 2019, Snap brought a complaint against VR in Idaho for tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, and subsequently

¹ The record on appeal references preliminary injunctions entered against former Snap employees Bradly Clay and Joseph Sanford, but contains only the order regarding Clay.

amended to add Landers as a defendant. See Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical Raise, LLC, Case No. CV28-19-8796 (Kootenai County, Idaho) (“Idaho lawsuit”).

Soon after, Snap filed this lawsuit for breach of contract, seeking damages and injunctive relief against ten other former Snap employees—Michael Argyrou, Alex Cardenas, Leera Kpea, Brian Lee, Chris Reinhardt, Leighton Rush, Marcus Thornton, Travis Tiner, Dylan Reda, and Jay Woodworth (collectively, Respondents). The Respondents had all signed the Snap sales representative agreement with its restrictive covenants and had subsequently joined VR as independent contractors. None of these former Snap employees was a resident of Washington State. Snap brought the lawsuit in King County, Washington, pursuant to the forum selection clause in the sales representative agreement.

Snap continued to pursue VR and Landers in the Idaho lawsuit. In December 2020, the Idaho court granted Snap’s motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining VR, Landers, “and anyone acting in concert or on behalf of Vertical Raise and Landers” from engaging in certain activities, including soliciting, accepting, or transacting business with Snap customers and business partners served by former Snap employees, aiding former Snap employees in breaching their sales representative agreements, compensating former Snap employees for transacting business with former Snap clients in the geographic area they had served for Snap, and obtaining or using Snap’s confidential, trade secret information.

Meanwhile, in King County, Respondents answered Snap's complaint, alleging several affirmative defenses, including hostile work environment leading to the Respondents' departure from the company and constructive discharge. In April 2021, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the restrictive covenants were void as a matter of law and unenforceable. The same day, Snap filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to strike the two affirmative defenses based on hostile work environment under CR 12(f), find the restrictive covenants valid and enforceable as a matter of law, and determine that Respondents breached the covenants. The trial court granted Snap's request to strike Respondents' hostile workplace affirmative defenses but denied summary judgment on all other issues. The court also denied the Respondents' motion for summary judgment.

Back in Idaho, Snap moved for partial summary judgment on its claims against VR and Landers for tortious interference with contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. In June 2021, the court determined that Snap had established a prima facie case of tortious interference and VR and Landers failed to provide any evidence of justification. The court concluded that VR and Landers personally were liable for tortious interference as a matter of law. The court also held that VR and Landers misappropriated Snap's trade secrets. The court granted partial summary judgment on the two claims.

The remaining issues went to trial, and a jury awarded Snap \$750,000 in economic damages for unjust enrichment, \$150,000 in punitive damages from

VR, and \$100,000 in punitive damages from Landers individually. Snap moved for additur, *i.e.*, additional damages, and received an additional \$410,021 for VR's unjust enrichment and \$900,000 for the cost to Snap for workforce replacement. In September 2021, the Idaho court granted a permanent injunction against VR, Landers, "and their employees, independent contractors, servants, and agents, and anyone acting in concert or on behalf of Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers," enjoining them from the same actions outlined in the preliminary injunction for 18 months.

During trial in the Idaho lawsuit, non-party and former Snap employee Paul Croghan appeared as a witness. While he was in Idaho to testify, Snap served him with a motion for contempt for violating the preliminary injunction.² The Idaho court dismissed the contempt proceedings against Croghan, concluding the preliminary injunction was overbroad and lacking in specificity such that it did not provide Croghan with proper notice of the scope of prohibited conduct. In addition, the trial court determined it lacked personal jurisdiction over Croghan.³

² Snap also filed multiple motions for contempt against VR/Landers for failing to abide by the preliminary injunction. The court subsequently dismissed Snap's motions for contempt against VR/Landers on due process grounds.

³ The court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction because Snap had failed to properly serve Croghan by violating the well-established privilege that a witness coming from another state or jurisdiction is exempt from service of process while in court. The court noted that it also lacked personal jurisdiction over Croghan under the Idaho long-arm statute, because Croghan worked in California, had not transacted business in Idaho, did not have minimum contacts with Idaho, and exercising jurisdiction did not comport with due process.

Back in King County, Respondents filed a motion to amend their answer to add affirmative defenses including res judicata, collateral estoppel, and material breach “based on harassment that the Defendants experienced in the workplace and that the hostile work environment was a material breach of the Defendants’ Sales Representative Agreements and employee handbook.” The court granted Respondents’ motion to amend to add affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel, res judicata, unjust enrichment, offset, and unconscionability, but denied the material breach defense because it was identical to the previously dismissed hostile work environment affirmative defenses. Two months later, Respondents moved for summary judgment on their affirmative defenses that Snap’s claims were precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the entry of the final judgment in the Idaho lawsuit against VR and Landers. The trial court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, concluding Snap’s claims were precluded by both collateral estoppel and res judicata. Under the terms of the agreement, Respondents requested and received attorney fees and costs.

Snap appeals the court’s dismissal of its breach of contract claim. Respondents cross-appeal the denial of the motion to amend and the amount of attorney fees awarded.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Dismissal of Snap's Claims

The trial court dismissed Snap's claims on summary judgment, citing both collateral estoppel and res judicata. We review orders on summary judgment de novo. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Fam. Home, 185 Wn.2d 532, 547, 374 P.3d 121 (2016). We construe evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998) (citing CR 56(c)).

As an initial matter, for clarity and consistency, in keeping with the more modern lexicon, we refer to res judicata as "claim preclusion" and collateral estoppel as "issue preclusion," unless referencing specific statements by a court or the parties.⁴ Issue preclusion and claim preclusion "are equitable doctrines that preclude relitigation of already determined causes." Weaver v. City of Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 472-73, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). The two doctrines share the goal of judicial finality and promoting judicial economy. Id. at 473. Claim preclusion refers to restrictions on relitigating the same claim or cause of action.

14A DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 35:20, at 552

⁴ As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" "have replaced a more confusing lexicon. Claim preclusion describes the rules formerly known as 'merger' and 'bar,' while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once known as 'collateral estoppel' and 'direct estoppel.'" Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 77, n.1, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984)).

(3d ed. 2018). Claim preclusion “bars litigation of *claims* that were brought or might have been brought in a prior proceeding.” Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473. By contrast, “instead of preventing a second assertion of the same claim or cause of action, [issue preclusion] prevents a relitigation of a particular issue in a later proceeding involving the same parties.” 14 ENDE, supra, § 35:32, at 595.

Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion apply are questions of law reviewed de novo. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473.

The parties address the elements of claim preclusion and issue preclusion together. However, because the doctrines and their elements are different, we address them separately.

A. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)

Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of an entire claim when a prior proceeding involving the same parties and issues culminated in a judgment on the merits.⁵ Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 480. In addition to the threshold requirement of a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit, the party asserting claim preclusion has the burden of proof to establish that the prior action and the

⁵ Without application of claim preclusion, the fact that VR and Landers were held liable for injury to Snap based on Respondents’ actions will not necessarily preclude claims against Respondents for the same conduct. As RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) states, “A judgment against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have against another person who may be liable therefor.” Comment a to § 49 explains,

When the claimant thus brings consecutive actions against different persons liable for the same harm, the rendition of the judgment in the first action does not terminate the claims against other persons who may be liable for the loss in question. The judgment itself has the effect of officially confirming the defendant’s obligation to make redress, an obligation which under the substantive law co-exists with that of the other obligor. No reason suggests itself why the legal confirmation of one obligation should limit or extinguish the other.

challenged action have “concurrence of identity” in four areas: (1) subject-matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Id. All four elements must be satisfied to establish claim preclusion. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108 (2004).

In disputing claim preclusion, Snap focuses on whether the two actions involve the same persons and parties, asserting that Respondents, as independent contractors, cannot be in privity with VR and Landers. Respondents are the same party⁶ for claim preclusion purposes if they are in privity. Feature Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis, LLP, 161 Wn.2d 214, 224, 164 P.3d 500 (2007). “ ‘Privity within the meaning of the doctrine of [claim preclusion] is privity as it exists in relation to the subject matter of the litigation, and the rule is construed strictly to mean parties claiming under the same title. It denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property.’ ” Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 764, 887 P.2d 898 (1995) (quoting Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 568, 354 P.2d 696 (1960)). Privity is also established when a nonparty is in actual control of the litigation or substantially participates in it. Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 764. A nonparty may also be in privity

⁶ Commentators have noted that the element “quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made” rarely adds any distinct analysis, and courts either conclude the third element, identity of parties, satisfies the quality of persons element, or collapse the two into one test. Kathleen M. McGinnis, Revisiting Claim and Issue Preclusion in Washington, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 75, 105 (2015); Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn. App. 779, 785, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999) (quoting Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805, 820 (1985)) (“[o]nly if there is identity of parties, including the privity concept, need one consider the fourth element, identify in the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”).

with a party if that party adequately represented the nonparty's interests in the prior proceeding. Feature Realty, 161 Wn.2d at 224.

An employer-employee relationship may be sufficient to establish privity for claim preclusion purposes. Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 764. For example, in Feature Realty, a former client filed and dismissed two legal malpractice lawsuits against a law firm and one of its attorneys in California. Id. at 218. The second dismissal amounted to an adjudication on the merits under CR 41(a)(4). Id. at 224. When Feature Realty filed a third lawsuit against a Washington attorney at the firm who had not been party to the prior two lawsuits, the court determined the attorney was in privity with the law firm and, therefore, entitled to the preclusive effects of claim preclusion. Id. at 224-25. Similarly, in Ensley v. Pitcher, an injured driver sued a drunk driver and the tavern that served her alcohol. 152 Wn. App. 891, 895, 222 P.3d 99 (2009). After partial summary judgment resulted in dismissal of claims against the tavern, Ensley brought the same claims against the bartender. Id. at 894. Although the bartender had not been named in the original suit, there was identity of the parties because the employer's liability turned solely on vicarious liability for the bartender's actions. Id. at 903.

Here, however, Respondents were not VR employees. Rather, Respondents agreed to work for VR as independent contractors.⁷ Unlike in an

⁷ The early VR independent contractor agreement did not provide any details about the amount of independence allotted to the contractor and control reserved to VR. A later revision of

employer-employee relationship, a principal is generally not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. DeWater v. State, 130 Wn.2d 128, 137, 921 P.2d 1059 (1996). Therefore, unlike in Ensley, vicarious liability cannot serve as the foundation for privity between Respondents and VR and Landers.

Despite the nature of the principal-independent contractor relationship, Respondents argue that “[o]ur courts do not distinguish between employees and independent contractors regarding [the] question of privity with their employer for activities undertaken within the scope of their employment.” Br. of Resp’t at 32. In support, Respondents cite Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn. App. 115, 118, 897 P.2d 365 (1995), which considered privity in the context of two lawsuits filed by a disgruntled employee. After being disciplined for harassing female co-workers, Kuhlman sued his employer, claiming violation of due process and breach of contract. Id. at 118-19. Kuhlman then brought the same claims against officers and employees of his employer. Id. at 118. After the original lawsuit against the employer was dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment, the court dismissed the suit against the officers and employees as precluded under both the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Id. at 119. On appeal, in assessing privity, this court noted that the liability of the employer in the first suit was premised on the actions of the employees named in the second suit. Id. at 122. In defending the first suit, the employer protected the interests of the

the independent contractor agreement provided specifics about the contractor as an independent contractor.

employees. Id. Therefore, we determined the parties were “sufficiently the same, if not identical.” Id.

In contrast, here, in the Idaho case, VR CEO Landers disclaimed responsibility for the actions of former Snap employees, such as Respondents, testifying, “[W]hen we hire guys they’re independent contractors. They go and get the business. We just set them up, train them on the software, and they go get the business.” Similarly, testifying about discussions VR had with sales representatives about the preliminary injunction, Landers noted, “[T]hey’re independent contractors. We told them not to violate this preliminary injunction,” and “I thought they would follow my directions and not violate it as we told them.” When asked, “Your people ran these fundraisers?” Landers replied, “Correct. These independent contractors.” Landers repeatedly emphasized that the former Snap employees were independent contractors, not VR employees. Rather than defend their interests, he distanced himself from their actions. Landers/VR and Respondents do not have a commonality of interests that would make them “sufficiently the same.”

Without a commonality of interest, or an employer-employee relationship that would lead to vicarious liability, the Respondents are not in privity with Landers or VR. Therefore, Snap’s current lawsuit against Respondents lacks a “concurrence of identity” of “persons or parties” with Snap’s prior case against Landers and VR. As a result, Respondents cannot establish one of the four elements required for claim preclusion. Claim preclusion does not apply to

preclude Snap's claims against Respondents, and the trial court erred by dismissing the case on this basis.

B. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)

Snap claims that the court "inverted preclusion rules" by holding it, rather than Respondents, estopped from contesting their liability for breach of contract. Issue preclusion precludes relitigation when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, such that the issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473. "Application of [issue preclusion] is limited to situations where the issue presented in the second proceeding is identical in all respects to an issue decided in the prior proceeding." Lemond v. Dep't of Licensing, 143 Wn. App. 797, 805, 180 P.3d 829 (2008).

According to Snap, "[t]he logical consequence of giving the Idaho judgment preclusive effect would be to bind Respondents to the Idaho jury's finding that Vertical Raise and Paul Landers facilitated their breaches of contract and that they are jointly liable for the damages flowing from their breaches."⁸ Respondents acknowledge they "work for Vertical Raise and just as in Idaho, Snap's claim for damages arises from alleged violations of their Snap employment agreements while working for Vertical Raise." But they then argue

⁸ Despite this possibility, Snap did not move the trial court to apply issue preclusion against Respondents on the legal issue of breach of their contract.

that because Snap already succeeded in obtaining a judgment on the issue, it cannot now relitigate the breach of contract—including the damages award.

This argument by Respondents conflates the distinct doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. Having addressed claim preclusion above, we now focus on the *issues* in the two cases, rather than the *claims*. And based on their arguments below and on appeal, Snap and Respondents agree that both the Idaho lawsuit and the current case involve the identical issue of Respondents' breach of their Snap sales representative agreements.⁹ We also agree.

In the Idaho lawsuit, the claim of tortious interference with contract required establishing (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and (4) injury to plaintiff resulting from the breach. See Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). Thus, in granting Snap's motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference claim, the Idaho court determined that Snap had satisfied each of these elements, including the existence of the contracts, and that by recruiting and hiring former Snap employees, VR and Landers had engaged in "a scheme to knowingly entice Snap employees to break their contracts with Snap." The Idaho court explained that VR and Landers "actively sought out and encouraged Snap employees to breach their contracts." Thus, the Idaho court's decision to grant summary judgment against VR and Landers on liability required concluding

⁹ Respondents characterize this as the same "cause of action" and same "right."

that the employees breached their contracts. As a result, the specific issues of the existence of the contracts and whether the former Snap employees breached those contracts are precluded from being further litigated.

In the present case, the breach of contract claim requires proof of three elements—the existence of a contract, its breach, and resulting damages. Nw. Indep. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 78 Wn. App. 707, 713, 899 P.2d 6 (1995). While the parties agree as to the preclusive effect of the Idaho case on the first two elements, existence of the contract and breach, they disagree as to the preclusive effect on the third element, resulting damages. Snap argues Respondents are bound by the Idaho court’s determination that they breached their contracts, resulting in liability for damages to be proven at trial, whereas Respondents argue Snap is barred from relitigating both liability and resulting damages. Therefore, we must consider whether issue preclusion bars Snap from litigating the issue of resulting damages in this case.

The party asserting issue preclusion as an affirmative defense has the burden of proof. Lemond, 143 Wn. App. at 805. The party asserting the defense—in this case, the Respondents—must establish four elements:

(1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented in the later proceeding; (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding; and (4) application of [issue preclusion] does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied.

Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 474. Because proof of all four elements is required, the failure to establish any one element prevents application of the doctrine. Lemond, 143 Wn. App. at 805. Additionally, “the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case in a prior proceeding.” Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473-74.

As discussed above, the identical issue of breach of the sales representative agreements was decided in the Idaho lawsuit. Further, the requirement of a final judgment on the issue of breach is satisfied, as the Idaho court granted summary judgment in Snap’s favor on the tortious interference claim, including on the element of intentional interference causing a breach of the contract. A trial on damages resulted in a jury verdict and judgment for Snap.¹⁰ Snap argues the injunction is unenforceable, resulting in a void judgment such that there is no final judgment on the merits. However, the Idaho judgment itself is neither unenforceable nor void.¹¹ The final judgment stands in the Idaho case and satisfies the second requirement for issue preclusion.

As to the third element, in the context of issue preclusion, privity requires that “the party *against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted* was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding.” Id. at 474 (emphasis added).

¹⁰ The trial court had also granted summary judgment finding VR and Landers liable for misappropriation of trade secrets. The jury did not award any damages for the misappropriation claim. The jury did find that VR and Landers engaged in unfair competition that caused damages to Snap and awarded punitive damages.

¹¹ Again, Respondents conflate issue and claim preclusion. While claim preclusion requires a final judgment against the same persons or parties, issue preclusion does not.

Because it is Respondents who seek to assert the doctrine against Snap, this element is satisfied because Snap is the same party in both actions.¹²

However, the parties disagree as to whether the issue of Respondents' liability for damages for breach of contract is identical in the Idaho case and the present case. In the Idaho case, the jury found VR's and Landers's actions constituting tortious interference and unfair competition resulted in damages for unjust enrichment totaling \$750,000 and awarded punitive damages against both VR and Landers. Subsequently, the Idaho trial court granted Snap's motion for additur of damages for workforce replacement through December 2020 as well as additional damages for unjust enrichment. In this case, Snap claims to seek damages for lost profits caused by Respondents' running additional fundraising campaigns after December 2020, as well as the "cost of assembled workforce." Snap's expert explained, "The cost of the assembled work represents Snap's recovery for investment in recruiting and training the Sales Reps. The earnings relating to lost profits are what those Sales Reps are able to generate AFTER they have received this training." Through these damages, Snap seeks to recoup the costs incurred to recruit and train Respondents, rather than the cost to retrain replacements for which VR and Landers were held liable in the Idaho lawsuit. Thus, the Respondents cannot establish that the issue of their liability for damages caused by their breach of contract in this case is identical to the

¹² The privity analysis under the doctrine of claim preclusion is different, as a claim is precluded only if there is a concurrence of identities in four areas, including "persons and parties." Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 480.

previously litigated issue of VR's and Landers's liability for damages for tortious interference with contract. As a result, issue preclusion does not bar litigation of the issue of damages caused by Respondents' breach of the agreement.¹³

II. Respondents' Cross-Appeal

Respondents raise two issues on cross-appeal. They argue the trial court erred by denying their motion to amend their answer to add a material breach affirmative defense and by awarding significantly reduced attorney fees.

A. Motion to Amend

The trial court denied Respondents' motion to amend their answer to add the material breach affirmative defense, concluding it was identical to the previously stricken affirmative defenses. Respondents argue they should be able to argue that Snap's breach of its employee handbook relieved them of any obligation to abide by the restrictive covenants in the agreement. Snap contends that Respondents did not assign error to the trial court's order striking the original

¹³ As to the fourth element required for application of issue preclusion, Snap argues that the trial court's ruling unjustly allows Respondents to avoid liability for breach of contract. For their part, Respondents claim that issue preclusion is not unjust because Snap chose to bring its action in Idaho and did not try to implead them into that action. But whether or not Snap could have brought such claims is not part of the analysis under the doctrine of issue preclusion, as it is for claim preclusion. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 481.

The parties also spar over whether Snap had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the liability of individual Respondents given the Idaho court's ruling on a contempt motion that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Croghan, an out-of-state VR independent contractor who did not have minimum contacts with the state. Additionally, Snap argues that the forum selection clause in Respondents' agreements with Snap named King County as the proper location for lawsuits arising from those contracts and, thus, would have prevented it from litigating against Respondents in the Idaho case. We need not address these arguments, as Respondents cannot establish that the identical issue of Respondents' liability for damages for breach of contract was litigated in the Idaho lawsuit.

two defenses and have failed to show how the new affirmative defense differs from those already struck. We agree with Snap.

CR 15(a) governs amendment of pleadings:

A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.

Otherwise, a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.

"The touchstone for the denial of a motion to amend is the prejudice such an amendment would cause to the nonmoving party." Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999). Factors to consider when determining whether amending would cause prejudice include undue delay, unfair surprise, and jury confusion. Id. at 505-06.

The decision to allow leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 505. "The trial court's decision 'will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.' " Id. (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)).

In their initial answer, Respondents raised several affirmative defenses, including the following:

2. Plaintiff's claims are barred by its own unclean hands and otherwise inequitable conduct, including that it knew or should have known that its

chief executive officer, Cole Morgan and other supervisors employed by Plaintiff, including employee Kenny Stivers, engaged in sexual harassment, discrimination, drug use, and retaliation against Answering Defendants and other Snap employees, all of which created a hostile work environment, which ultimately forced Answering Defendants to leave the company.

3. Snap's hostile work environment, including the sexual harassment, discrimination, drug use, and retaliation engaged in by Snap officers such as Morgan and Stivers, lead [sic] to the constructive discharge of Answering Defendants.

The trial court struck these two defenses on Snap's request.¹⁴ Respondents then moved to amend to add "material breach" as an affirmative defense, explaining "Snap's material breach is based on harassment that the Defendants experienced in the workplace and that the hostile work environment was a material breach of the Defendants' sales representative agreements and employee handbook." The trial court denied the motion to add the "material breach" defense, deeming it "identical to the hostile work environment/discrimination defenses" that it had previously stricken.

As Respondents acknowledged, the newly proposed "material breach" affirmative defense was based on the hostile work environment and harassment they purported to experience while at Snap. The two prior affirmative defenses also relied on similar allegations of hostile work environment and harassment. The three defenses are different approaches to the same concept based on the same factual predicate: Snap's hostile workplace led Respondents to leave the

¹⁴ On appeal, Respondents do not challenge the court's decision to strike these defenses.

company and relieved them of their obligations under the restrictive covenants in the sales representative agreement. The trial court had already rejected two forms of this constructive discharge defense. The trial court's denial of the motion to add the "material breach" defense was consistent with its prior order and was not a manifest abuse of discretion.

B. Attorney Fees

Under the terms of the sales representative agreements, the prevailing party is entitled to fees:

8. Prevailing party attorney fees, costs, and expense recovery. The court shall award the prevailing party in any dispute arising out of or related to this Agreement all its reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred in the dispute.

The trial court awarded Respondents attorney fees as the prevailing party below. Respondents argue the court abused its discretion in determining the amount of fees. However, because Respondents are no longer the prevailing party, we reverse the attorney fee award. Any award of fees is deferred until resolution of Snap's breach of contract claims. See Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 153, 94 P.3d 930, (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464 (2017) ("Where a party has succeeded on appeal but has not yet prevailed on the merits, the court should defer to the trial court to award attorney fees.").

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred by applying claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) to bar Snap's claims against Respondents in their

entirety. We agree with the parties that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars relitigation of the existence of the sales representative agreements and Respondents' breach of these contracts. However, the resulting damages for which Respondents are alleged to be liable are not identical to those awarded in the Idaho case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chung, J.

WE CONCUR:

Seldman, J.

Hylton, J.

APPENDIX

B

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ARGYROU, an individual;
LEERA KPEA, an individual; BRIAN
LEE, an individual; LEIGHTON RUSH,
an individual; MARCUS THORNTON,
an individual; TRAVIS TINER, an
individual; JAY WOODWORTH, an
individual,

Respondents,

ALEX CARDENAS, an individual;
CHRIS REINHARDT, an individual;
DYLAN REDA, an individual,

Defendants.

No. 83766-4-I

DIVISION ONE

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
DENYING MOTION TO
PUBLISH, AND AMENDING
OPINION

Respondents Michael Argyrou, Leera Kpea, Brian Lee, Leighton Rush, Marcus Thornton, Travis Tiner and Jay Woodworth filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to publish the opinion filed on December 26, 2023 in the above case. Appellant Snap! Mobile filed an answer. A majority of the panel has determined that the motions should be denied but the opinion amended.

Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration and motion to publish are denied. The opinion filed on December 26, 2023 shall be amended as follows:

1. On Page 18, the following sentences:

In this case, Snap claims to seek damages for lost profits caused by Respondents' running additional fundraising campaigns after December 2020, as well as the "cost of assembled workforce." Snap's expert explained, "The cost of the assembled work represents Snap's recovery for investment in recruiting and training the Sales Reps. The earnings relating to lost profits are what those Sales Reps are able to generate AFTER they have received this training."

shall be deleted and replaced with the following:

In this case, Snap initially sought damages for lost profits caused by Respondents' running additional fundraising campaigns after December 2020, as well as the "cost of assembled workforce." Prior to the summary judgment hearing, Snap withdrew its claim for workforce damages. As to lost profits, Snap's expert explained, "The earnings relating to lost profits are what those Sales Reps are able to generate AFTER they have received this training."

2. On Page 18, the following sentence shall be deleted:

Through these damages, Snap seeks to recoup the costs incurred to recruit and train Respondents, rather than the cost to retrain replacements for which VR and Landers were held liable in the Idaho lawsuit.

The remainder of this opinion shall remain the same.

FOR THE COURT:

Chung, J.

Seldman, J.

Hagg, AJ

APPENDIX

C

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Attorneys for Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

VERTICAL RAISE, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, PAUL LANDERS,
individually,

Defendants.

CASE NO. CV28-19-8796

**DECLARATION OF NATHAN S.
OHLER DATED JUNE 17, 2024**

I, Nathan S. Ohler, and in conformity with Idaho Code § 9-1406(1) and with I.R.C.P. 2.7,
hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 years and am the attorney for Defendants Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers (together “Defendants”) and I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. I submit this declaration in Support of Defendants’

2. Attached hereto as **Exhibit “A”** is a true and correct copy of email correspondence sent to me by Danielle Ortiz, Vice President & Director, Court/Probate Bond Attorney, on April 27, 2024.

3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit “B”** is a true and correct copy of my email correspondence to Emma Nowacki at Duke Evett sent on April 23, 2024.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 17th day of June, 2024.

/s/ Nathan S. Ohler

Nathan S. Ohler, Of the Firm

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2024, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

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/s/ Jennifer Escruceria

Jennifer Escruceria

EXHIBIT "A"

From: [Ortiz, Danielle](#)
To: [Emma Nowacki](#); [Keely Duke](#); [Nathan Ohler](#)
Subject: RE: Vertical Raise, LLC & Paul Landers / Appeal / SNAP! Mobile, Inc. / 3487623
Date: Saturday, April 27, 2024 7:31:22 PM
Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[240426 - Executed & Notarized Release.pdf](#)

Markel Insurance Company You don't often get email from danielle.ortiz@markel.com. [Learn why this is important](#)

Hi All,

I confirm receipt of the executed and notarized Release. The \$1,239,525.85. will be wired on Monday (4/29/24).

Danielle Ortiz
Vice President & Director, Court/Probate Bond Attorney
Markel Surety

Markel Insurance Company/ SureTec Insurance Company
Phyllis Modlin, Qualified Manager, California License No. 2M36698

Direct: +1.714.657.1007

Internal: ext. 351007

5555 Garden Grove Boulevard, Suite 275, Westminster, CA 92683

[markel.com](#)



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FINAL RELEASE

This Release ("Release"), dated April 26, 2024, is given

BY the Releasor: Snap! Mobile, Inc., referred to as "Releasor"

TO the Releasee: SureTec Insurance Company ("SureTec"), referred to as "Releasee".

1. Recitals. Vertical Raise LLC, a Limited Liability Company, and Paul Landers, Individually, filed Supersedeas Undertaking Bond No. 3487623, issued by Releasee, dated February 8, 2022 in the action entitled *Snap! Mobile Inc. v. Vertical Raise LLC et al.*, in the District Court of Idaho, County of Kootenai, Case No. CV28-19-8796, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 22-613; Idaho Code Section 13-202; and Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b). Pursuant to said Undertaking Bond, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15), Releasee obligated itself to Releasor, jointly and severally, together with Vertical Raise LLC, a Limited Liability Company, and Paul Landers, Individually, to pay on behalf of Vertical Raise, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, and Paul Landers, individually, all sums found to be due and owing by Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers by reason of the outcome of the appeal, within 30 days of the filing of the remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court, up to the full amount of the bond, as applicable, and as required by other Idaho law. On March 28, 2024, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a remittitur for all sums due and owing, thereby requirement payment to Releasor by April 27, 2024 pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15). On April 26, 2024, Releasee was notified of the Remittitur by counsel for Releasor. On April 26, 2024, Releasor discovered that Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers had failed to notify Releasee of the issuance of the Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court, and that payment by April 27, 2024 would be an undue hardship on Releasee.
2. Release. Subject only to payment in good funds by Releasee to Releasor in the amount of One Million, Two Hundred and Thirty Nine Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars and Eighty Five Cents (\$1,239,525.85) (the "Release Payment") by the date of April 29, 2024, Releasor releases, waives, relinquishes and forever discharges and gives up any and all claims which Releasor may now have, might have, or could hereafter have against Releasee, of any type or kind, known or unknown, which Releasor have or may have relating to or arising from the Undertaking for Appeal, bearing Bond No. 3487623, dated February 8, 2022 and executed by SureTec, in connection with the action entitled *Snap! Mobile Inc. v. Vertical Raise LLC et al.*, in the District Court of Idaho, County of Kootenai, Case No. CV28-19-8796.
3. Limitations. This Agreement is between Releasor and Releasee. Releasor does not release Vertical Raise LLC, a limited liability company, and Paul Landers, individually, from any amount still due and owing in the action entitled *Snap! Mobile Inc. v. Vertical Raise LLC et al.*, in the District Court of Idaho, County of Kootenai, Case No. CV28-19-8796. Specifically, Releasor does not relinquish its claims for interest that may be due from date of judgment of October 15, 2021 on the One Million, Two Hundred and Thirty Nine Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars and Eighty Five Cents (\$1,239,525.85)

(the "Release Payment").

4. Payment. Payment by Releasee or on Releasee's behalf as set forth above shall constitute payment in full for making this Release. Releasor authorizes and directs SureTec to wire the Release Payment to the following account:

Comerica Bank
333 West Santa Clara Street (Branch #948)
San Jose, CA 95113

Account Number: 1895280426
Routing Number: 121137522
Account Name: Snap Mobile Inc.

3. Who is Bound. I am bound by this Release, as is anyone who succeeds to My rights. This Release is made for Releasee's benefit and all who succeed to Releasee's rights.

Snap! Mobile, Inc.

Hosea H Harvey III

By: Hosea H Harvey III

Title: General Counsel

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

STATE OF Texas)
) SS Houston, Texas
COUNTY OF Harris)

On 26th April, 2024 before me, Vendayla Monice Jubilee McNeil, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared Hosea H Harvey III, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OR PERJURY under the laws of the State of Texas that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Signature: Vendayla Monice Jubilee McNeil
Notary Public, State of Texas
County of Harris
10/12/2025




EXHIBIT “B”

From: Nathan Ohler

Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2024 11:56 AM

To: Emma Nowacki <ecn@dukeevett.com>

Cc: Keely Duke <ked@dukeevett.com>; Madison E. Basterrechea <meb@dukeevett.com>; Sandee Stogsdill <sls@dukeevett.com>; Aleesa McCormack <asm@dukeevett.com>

Subject: RE: Snap! v. VR/Landers Attorneys fees and costs

Emma,

The trial court entered judgment of \$800,000 on October 15, 2021. Snap successfully moved for additur and was instructed to prepare an order conditionally granting a new trial subject to the additur, but instead Snap submitted an amended judgment which was entered December 14, 2021 in the amount of \$2,349,546.85, which included the additur amount and the costs.

In his ruling, the trial court held that prejudgment interest was improper but none-the-less included it in the additur. VR appealed the Amended Judgment. Snap attempted to execute on the moot judgment by arguing that the appeal of the amended judgment and post of a bond thereon did not stay the moot judgment. VR argued that the motion for additur or new trial destroyed the final judgment's finality (IAR 14(a)). VR timely appealed the amended judgment (IAR 14(a) and IRCP 54(a)(2)). The amended judgment was stayed by order the Supreme Court.

Had Snap prepared a written order required IAR 14(a) as requested by the trial court instead of submitting an amended judgment, things would have played out differently. As stated in VR's motion to stay enforcement of the amended judgment:

Had a written order had been entered as required by I.A.R. 14(a), Defendants' time to appeal would have commenced to run from the date of the clerk's filing stamp. And the Final Judgment would remain final and appealable, subject only to an amended judgment awarding costs to Snap. Under that scenario, Defendants would be seeking to stay enforcement of a money judgment in an amount of \$800,000, plus a cost award. The Amended Judgment erroneously awarding Snap a conditional additur does not change that status quo. The status quo in this case is the amount of the Amended Judgment minus the additur amounts, which totals \$1,039,525.85. The district court erred in refusing to accept the supersedeas bond in the amount of \$1,413,755.16 and staying the enforcement of the Amended Judgment. See I.A.R. 13(b)(15).

The Supreme Court's Opinion recognized that the amended judgment was the only "judgment" final and appealable, and recognized the procedural posture chosen by Snap in lieu of that which was ordered by the trial court:

Following the oral ruling, the trial court directed Snap's counsel to "prepare an order to that effect." However, instead of submitting a proposed order conditionally granting a new trial subject to an additur, Snap submitted an "Amended Judgment," which awarded Snap the additur without VR/Landers being consulted or being given the option of accepting the additur in lieu of a new trial. The amended judgment was signed and entered by the trial court. VR/Landers have not accepted the additur or requested a new trial.

The Supreme Court reversed the amended judgment's inclusion of additur and ruled in VR's favor on all issues except the award of discretionary costs, which it affirmed.

In short, the "final" judgment from October 2021 was destroyed when Snap obtained an amended judgment, which was reversed on appeal. Further, your proposed judgment adds \$200k to that moot judgment. Applying the above procedural posture to IC 28-22-104(2), there is therefore no judgment upon which post judgment interest would accrue until the attached modified amended judgment is entered on remand. See *Mitchell v. Flandro* 95 Indho 236 (adopting the rule from a sister state that "[When] a judgment is reversed on appeal [***5] the new award subsequently entered by the trial court can bear interest only from the date of entry of such new judgment.>").

I have attached a proposed judgment that VR will accept. I'll be happy to discuss when I call you tomorrow evening following my call with the bond surety.

Thanks – Nathan

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@dukeevett.com
Emma C. Nowacki
ISB #10742; ecn@dukeevett.com
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1087 West River Street, Suite 300
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Jeff Bone, admitted *pro hac vice*
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CORR CRONIN, LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, WA 98154
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Facsimile (206) 625-0900

Attorneys for Plaintiff SNAP! Mobile, Inc.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

VERTICAL RAISE, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, and PAUL LANDERS,
individually,

Defendants.

VERTICAL RAISE, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Counterclaimant,

vs.

SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Counterdefendant.

Case No. CV28-19-8796

**SECOND AMENDED
JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER on Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court on March 28, 2024, and in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision dated February 2, 2024:

JUDGMENT IS AMENDED AND ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Against Vertical Raise and Paul Landers in the sum of \$1,000,000.00 plus post-judgment interest at the legal rate ~~from the date of this Judgment allowed by law from date of judgment of October 15, 2021~~ until this Judgment is satisfied in full.
2. Against Vertical Raise and Paul Landers for costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) for the sum of \$239,535.85 plus post-judgment interest at the legal rate allowed by law from the date of ~~this Judgment judgment of December 14, 2021~~ until this Judgment is satisfied in full.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED _____

By _____
Honorable John T. Mitchell
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed the foregoing document and served a copy of the same to the following persons:

Nathan S. Ohler
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP, PLLC
435 w. Hanley Avenue, Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Attorneys for Defendant Vertical Raise, LLC

☐ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
☐ Hand Delivered
☐ Facsimile (208) 664-5884
☒ iCourt/Email
nohler@lclattorneys.com

K. Jill Bolton
Bolton Law, PLLC
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

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April M. Linscott, ISB #7036
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☒ iCourt/Email
ked@dukeevett.com;
ecn@dukeevett.com; sls@dukeevett.com

DATED _____.

By: _____
Clerk



Outlook

Re: Court of Appeals No. 83766-4; Snap Mobile, Inc. v. Michael Argyrou, et al.

From OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK <SUPREME@COURTS.WA.GOV>

Date Wed 11/13/2024 9:38 AM

To Patti Saiden <saiden@carneylaw.com>

Cc lawrence@cflseattle.com <lawrence@cflseattle.com>; jlovejoy@corrchronin.com <jlovejoy@corrchronin.com>; jbone@corrchronin.com <jbone@corrchronin.com>; mrobbins@corrchronin.com <mrobbins@corrchronin.com>; heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com <heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com>; lawrence@cflseattle.com <lawrence@cflseattle.com>; jlovejoy@corrchronin.com <jlovejoy@corrchronin.com>; jbone@corrchronin.com <jbone@corrchronin.com>; mrobbins@corrchronin.com <mrobbins@corrchronin.com>; heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com <heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com>; howard@washingtonappeals.com <howard@washingtonappeals.com>; cate@washingtonappeals.com <cate@washingtonappeals.com>; irina@cflseattle.com <irina@cflseattle.com>; cnelson@corrchronin.com <cnelson@corrchronin.com>; slarussa@corrchronin.com <slarussa@corrchronin.com>; Mark Rosencrantz <rosencrantz@carneylaw.com>; Sidney C. Tribe <tribe@carneylaw.com>; Lana Ramsey <ramsey@carneylaw.com>; Court of Appeals, Division I <COA1@courts.wa.gov>

Received 11-13-24

Supreme Court Clerk's Office

From: Patti Saiden <saiden@carneylaw.com>

Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2024 9:29 AM

To: OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK <SUPREME@COURTS.WA.GOV>

Cc: lawrence@cflseattle.com <lawrence@cflseattle.com>; jlovejoy@corrchronin.com <jlovejoy@corrchronin.com>; jbone@corrchronin.com <jbone@corrchronin.com>; mrobbins@corrchronin.com <mrobbins@corrchronin.com>; heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com <heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com>; lawrence@cflseattle.com <lawrence@cflseattle.com>; jlovejoy@corrchronin.com <jlovejoy@corrchronin.com>; jbone@corrchronin.com <jbone@corrchronin.com>; mrobbins@corrchronin.com <mrobbins@corrchronin.com>; heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com <heidiurnesslaw@gmail.com>; howard@washingtonappeals.com <howard@washingtonappeals.com>; cate@washingtonappeals.com <cate@washingtonappeals.com>; irina@cflseattle.com <irina@cflseattle.com>; cnelson@corrchronin.com <cnelson@corrchronin.com>; slarussa@corrchronin.com <slarussa@corrchronin.com>; Mark Rosencrantz <rosencrantz@carneylaw.com>; Sidney C. Tribe <tribe@carneylaw.com>; Lana Ramsey <ramsey@carneylaw.com>; Court of Appeals, Division I <COA1@courts.wa.gov>

Subject: Court of Appeals No. 83766-4; Snap Mobile, Inc. v. Michael Argyrou, et al.

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where you are asked to validate using your Account and Password, **DO NOT DO SO!** Instead, report the incident.

Attached for filing please find the *Petition for Review* in the referenced matter.

I am available to make the payment of the filing fee by credit card at your earliest convenience.

My direct dial is listed below.

Thank you,

Patti Saiden

Legal Assistant

CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN, P.S.

206-293-2645 Direct | 206-622-8020 Main

[Address](#) | [Website](#)

saiden@carneylaw.com

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